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ARGUMENT
May a municipality, via plat amendment, take real property away from one
private party and give it to another? The answer is no. Neither Park City nor the
Wilsons offer any convincing reason to the contrary.
I.
Its Claims of Ineffectiveness Notwithstanding, Park City Effected a Taking when it
Amended the Plat and "Relocated" the Easement
Park City deems itself a paper tiger, unable truly to affect property rights, and
instead empowered only administratively to alter plats, the exercise of which ability
purportedly does not implicate private interests:
Significantly, while the Cityfs decision moved the platted location of a nonexclusive ski easement, at no time did the City Council make any findings
or purport to make any ruling concerning whether or to what extent ABS
had private property rights in the location of the originally platted ski
easement pursuant to the subdivision's Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions (MCC&Rsff) or otherwise, and the City did not purport to
extinguish any private property right in any easement at the original
location.
Brief of Appellees Park City Municipal Corporation and Park City Council ("Park City's
Brief) at 4 - 5 . 1
l

See also id. at 13 ("the city's administrative action amending the plat [did not] affect
whatever private property rights ABS may be able to establish in the location of the
easement as it was originally platted . . . ."); at 15 ("Not surprisingly, nowhere in the
Ordinance changing the plat does the City purport to either establish or extinguish
whatever private property rights ABS may have in the originally platted easement"); at 18
("whatever the City's administrative decision, ABS had a legal process available to it to
establish and protect its rights"); at 22 - 23 ("The plat amendment process simply
provided ABS a forum where it could object to a plat amendment based upon the
(Continued . . . )

Park City thus claims that ABS proceeds upon a "profound misconception" and is
otherwise "fundamentally

mistaken" when it comes to the "relatively simple

administrative determination to allow a plat amendment." Park City's Brief at 12. The
City's only role is to mark changes on a map. Takings are left to the courts. Id.
Park City succeeds only in evincing the need for firm judicial intervention in this
municipal behavior, for nothing would have happened to the ABS property right if Park
City had not illegally amended the plat and moved the easement (followed by the grant of
a building permit, which never could otherwise have been issued). The right of ABS to
invoke subsequent "legal process" against the harm inflicted is cold comfort measured
against the fact that as a direct result of Park City's plat amendment, the Wilsons' "dream
home," Park City's Brief at 7, now sits squarely athwart the deeded ABS easement.
Although they of course quibble with the ABS allegation of illegality, the Wilsons
otherwise properly recognize Park City's critical role:
Since construction of their home on lot 23 entailed expanding the size of
the "build pad" on the subdivision plat map and moving the ski easement
further down on their lot, Appellees Wilson also applied to Park City for a
subdivision plat amendment.
Brief of Intervenor-Appellees ("Wilsons' Brief) at 7. And Park City itself of course
knew exactly what it was doing, for the record is replete with ABS arguments to the City
Council that the easement could not be amended without depriving ABS of property

standards applicable in such a forum. It did not extinguish ABS's rights.").

i

rights, and Council rejoinders that because the easement was not "separately recorded/'
it was subject to relocation. The decision below should be reversed.
II.
An Express Easement Created by Plat Reference is Still an Express Easement.
One can pinpoint exactly where Park City went wrong in this process:
The easement was recorded as an easement on the Evergreen plat but was
never recorded separately. In discussion with the City Attorney, it was
determined that State Code rules regarding modification and amendment
apply to non-exclusive easements that have been dedicated by subdivision
plat only.
Rec. at 1210 (April 24, 2002 Planning Commission Meeting Minutes) (emphasis added).
Thus, while it may be powerless to move private easements that have been "recorded
separately" from a plat, Park City otherwise deems itself free to act when an easement is
shown only by plat.
Park City errs. "[Express] easements may . . . be created as a covenant or through
a conveyance referring either to a plat depicting easements or to a recorded declaration of
easements."3 Both Appellees4 completely mischaracterize the ABS argument on the plat
2

See Rec. at 477 (Minutes of April 24, 2002 Planning Commission Meeting), at 544
(March 23, 2002 City Council meeting).
3

David A. Thomas & James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property
Law § 12.02(b)(1) (Lexis 1999) (citing Robert Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and
Conveyancing, 38 Cal. L. Rev. 426, 437-38 (1950) (emphasis added). Cf Hofmeister v.
Sparks, 660 N.W.2d 637, 638 (S.D. 2003) (plaintiffs "own land in a subdivision . . . .
Their property rights include a platted 66* access easement across two other parcels of
land.").
4

Park City's Brief"at 2 1 - 2 2 ; Wilsons1Brief at 22 -23.

i

issue, for ABS is not arguing that the easement had no business being on the plat in the
first place.

ABS is arguing that municipalities have no right to extinguish private

property rights shown on a plat. Private rights created via plat remain private rights,
immune (except in cases of takings for public use, which indisputably did not occur here)
from municipal alteration:
The mere fact that restrictions are inscribed upon the plat does not make
them subject to commission approval. They are a matter of private
concern, and are not for the public's use and benefit, as are streets and
utility easements. They are frequently inscribed upon plats, but this is a
matter of convenience only. They are contractual. Mutuality of covenant
and consideration exists between the several owners of land made subject
to a scheme of improvements. Their character is not altered by the manner
of their documentation.
Pubs v. Bailey, 302 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ind. 1973). (emphasis added).
Thus, in Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002), the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision enjoining a planning commission from vacating
restrictive covenants that appeared on a plat:
The property interest at issue here is the restrictive covenant that was
included in the plat of Broadmoor limiting construction in the plats to
single-family residences
Daniels, as owners of the right to enforce the
covenant pursuant to their ownership of a lot in Broadmoor, may no longer
prevent commercial development in the Lots, which were in the original
plat of Broadmoor.
Because they have been dispossessed of this
enforcement ability by the Plan Commission, they have demonstrated a
property right that has been taken by state action.
Id. at 459. See also MacMeekin v. Low Income Housing Institute, 45 P.3d 570, 579
(Wash. App. 2002) (easements, however created, are property rights, and as such are not
subject to relocation absent the consent of both parties.").

Moreover, "[t]he warranty deed to ABS conveyed title and a ski easement over Lot
23 as shown on the Amended Plat of Evergreen," Ruling and Order at 5,5 which deed is a
separate recordation. Similarly, the initial deed from the Evergreen developer transferred
title to Lot 23 to the Wilsons' predecessor subject to "[a]ny and all easements and rights
of way over, along, and across said property as shown on the recorded plat." Rec. at
1368.
Both the trial court and Park City recognized that the City had no interest in the
easement. See Ruling and Order at 5 ("The ski easements were not dedicated to Park
City but were created for the benefit of the owners of each lot in the subdivision"), Rec. at
452 (City minutes; "While the ski easements are shown on a recorded plat, the City is not
a party to the ski easement"), at 457 (minutes; "[t]he City does not hold the easement.").
In claiming the municipal power to rearrange easements on a plat, Park City confuses
public easements with plat easements showing a private property right. See Pulos v.
Bailey, supra, 302 N.E.2d at 775 (private restrictions recorded on a plat "are a matter of
private concern, and are not for the public's use and benefit, as are streets and utility
easements.").
There is further no way to limit Park City's newly-minted municipal power solely
to the relocation of easements.

For example, plats must contain, inter alia, "the

5

See also Davis v. Epting, 454 S.E.2d 325, 327 (S.C. App. 1994) ("Where land is
subdivided, platted into lots, and sold by reference to the plats, the buyers acquire a
special property right in the roads shown on the plat . . . if the deed references the plat,
the grantee acquires a private easement for the use of all streets on the map.").

<

boundaries, course, and dimensions of the parcels of ground," Utah Code Ann. § 10-9804(1), and Mthe acreage or square footage for all parcels, units, or lots, and the length
and width of the blocks and lots intended for sale

" Utah Code Ann. 10-9-804(l)(c).

Under Appellees1 reading of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-808 (which permits plat
amendments), a municipality could change lot lines if the owner's deed simply referred to
the property description as set forth on the plat — which is the common method of
describing subdivision lots on all recorded deeds, and indeed was the process used for the
Evergreen lots. See, e.g., Rec. at 1367. A municipality could decide that a landowner
really does not need that second driveway and erase it from the fee.
If the plat statute really means what Park City and the Wilsons say it means, then
the law is unconstitutional.6

Statutes must be read, when possible, to avoid such

infirmity. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988) ("To the extent they endorsed
a broad reading of the ordinance, the lower courts ran afoul of the well-established
principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties"). Given a
choice between Appellees1 interpretation of the statute and one which permits a

6

See Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, supra, 306 F.3d 445, 462 (7th Cir. 2002)
(affirming injunction against planning commission's use of plat statute to lift restrictive
covenant solely for benefit of a private citizen; such use would be an illegal taking of
private property for private purposes); Pulos v. Bailey, supra, 302 N.E.2d 768, 775 (Ind.
1973) (striking down, under United States and Indiana Constitutions, statute which
permitted planning commission to vacate covenants recorded on plats).

£

municipality to affect only easements dedicated to the public, the latter construction must
win out.7 The decision below should be reversed.
III.
This Appeal is Ripe
ABS filed two separate actions in response to the events below. The action at bar
results from a statutory procedure permitting petitions for review of an administrative
decision.

The other action is a "private" lawsuit, names a number of defendants,

including the Wilsons, as well as Park City, and seeks damages and injunctive relief
arising, inter alia, from conflicts of interest on the Architectural Committee -- of which
Brad Wilson was a member — and from the presentation of false evidence to Park City.
Park City deems this appeal premature, given that the ABS private action remains
undecided. The trial court declined ABSfs efforts to move the other case forward and
ruled that the administrative appeal would have to be decided first:
This case was initiated by a petition for review filed by ABS on June 24,
2002 . . . . On the same date ABS filed a separate action, docket no.
020500298, seeking a declaratory judgment against Wilson and these
defendants and others. That case has proceeded and the court has denied a
TRO and a motion for summary judgment, stating that this case needed to

7

And even in cases where a city abandons an easement dedicated to public use, a private
right of access continues. Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112 (Utah 2001)
(adjoining landowners retained right of passage after Salt Lake City abandoned an alley
easement; servient estate properly ordered to tear down obstructing wall.)
8

See Rec. at 453 (minutes; "The Evergreen Architectural Review Committee (ARC), of
which Mr. Wilson is a member, has supplied several items of correspondence addressing
the issue of equity.").

7

be decided before the merits of that case could be addressed. The parties
agreed on April 3, 2003, to lift the stay previously agreed to in this case.
Ruling and Order at 1. Once this case went to judgment, ABS had no choice but to
appeal.
Contrary to Park City's description of that tribunal's ruling, the trial court
attributed a takings analysis to the municipality. Ruling and Order at 8. If the decision
below in this suit is reversed, as we respectfully request that it should be, many issues in
the private suit will be resolved as well. If the decision is affirmed, the private suit will
retain vitality. In either case, this appeal is ripe.
IV.
ABS has Met its Marshalling Obligation.
The Wilsons deem ABS in default of its duty to marshal the facts, and urge
affirmance on that basis alone. Wilsons' Brief'at 11 - 12.
There is no duty to marshal evidence when the action complained of simply is
illegal. Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App.
1995).9 And no one in fact disputes Park City's skeletal findings in the case at bar: the
Wilsons have an address, their lot is crossed by an easement, the Architectural
Committee and developer had preliminarily approved the house plans (although the
Architectural Committee, clearly worried by what was afoot, warned its own member that

9

For example, no matter how many good reasons would appear for such an action, it
presumably is undisputed that Park City could not redraw a private lot line to give a
portion of one lot to another.

»

,f

[a] party encroaching on an easement does so at his own risk" and advised Wilson to get

ABS consent; Rec. at 0421);10 no:i:e had been given that Lot 23 might try to enlarge its
building pad; the CC&Rfs address ski easements, and Lot 22 was permitted to expand its
own build pad, although "not having a ski easement on the lot." Rec. at 0704 - 0705
(ordinance).11
While they concede that this is all that Park City found, Wilsons' Brief 'at 12 -13,
the Wilsons urge, id. at 13, that these facts suffice to "push forward into the mind the
probability of good cause" supporting Park City's ultimate conclusion of law: that no
material injury would result if the ABS easement was moved 90 feet down the hill.12
Even if it were otherwise legal for Park City to relocate a private easement, one
cannot derive the ultimate conclusion of "no material harm" from the de minimis findings

Thus, ABS's predecessor agreed with the owner of Lot 21 that an easement could be
narrowed and bridged to facilitate construction of a larger home. Similarly, the
Architectural Committee warned the Wilsons that they encroached on the ABS easement
at their own risk, and should secure ABS consent.
11

As we discuss below, this final finding is one of the many places where Park City's and
the Wilsons1 arguments from equity fall apart: unlike the Wilsons1 lot, the ABS lot,
burdened by no easement, affected no easement when its pad was expanded.
Contrary to the Wilsons1 representation, Wilsons' Brief at 7, "m," ABS never made the
distressing argument that it wanted "free use of all of lot 23 to get to the ski run . . . ."
(emphasis added). To support this purported "fact," the Wilsons cite statements not by
ABS, but by Brooks Robinson of the Park City planning staff. Robinson said what no one
disputes: prior to construction of the Wilson house, skiers cut across the Wilson lot. Rec.
atl071D,lns. 1 6 - 1 7 .
Similarly - again contrary to the Wilsons1 representations, Wilsons' Brief at 7, "1,"
— ABS confirmed and reconfirmed that while it liked its view, its objections were not
based primarily on "view issues." Rec. at 0439 (March 13, 2002 Work Session Notes).

0

recited, particularly when an ABS member partner "would have to climb up the mountain
over 100 extra feet [through snow] to access her ski door[,]"13 when Park City rejected
the "strong[] suggestion"14 made by ABS - in order to counter rampant Planning
Commission speculation about the site15 -- that the Council postpone argument until after
it could visit the site, and when ABS stated that it would not have purchased the home
had it known that the easement could be moved.16
V.
The Taking was the Injury.
Park City moved the ABS easement 90 feet downhill from the front door of the
ABS residence.17 It is now impossible - as the trial court noted — to use that easement to
ski to the residence. The court nonetheless decided that no harm was caused by this

Rec. at 477 (April 24, 2002 Planning Commission Meeting).
14

Rec. at 543 (May 23, 2002 City Council Meeting). See also Rec. at 1071G, Ins. 12 - 20
(transcript).
15

Although he showed the Council on a map that the ABS door was close to the terminus
of the easement, Rec. at 107IE, Ins. 5 - 7 , Brooks Robinson of the Planning Commission
further hypothesized that because skiers using the ABS easement would have to make a
sharp turn to get up a hill before the front door, it would make no difference whether they
made a sharp turn 90 feet down the hill or 12 feet from the door. Rec. at 107IF, Ins. 9 14.
l6

Rec. at 439.

17

Park City alleges that the easement was moved 60 feet north. Park City's Brief dX 4 n.2,
Park City elsewhere states that the easement was moved "some 60 feet downhill." Id. at
7.

in

relocation, because before the Wilson home was built, the ABS easement was not used
anyway:
It is clear from the evidence that now there is no ski-in access across Lot 23
to Lot 22. However, the Council had evidence that in fact the platted
previous easement was not used for ski-in access, but that the users of the
easement "cut the comer" and went in a place that was not platted because
of the grade and trees and shrubs. Thus, the Council could have and did
find evidence that there was no injury in moving the easement as the platted
easement was not in fact used to ski-in in any event.
Ruling and Order at 8 - 9.

(emphasis added).

It is perhaps not to be unexpected that skiers will take the path of least resistance,
and thus cut diagonally across an open slope rather than take right-angle turns. Such
actions do not work a forfeiture of the original easement once the open slope is blocked
by the fee owner:
[A] right-of-way by express grant is not extinguished by mere nonuse, and
the fact that the easement holder finds a more convenient alternative route
does not deprive the easement holder of the easement that remains for the
holder's use and enjoyment whenever the holder has occasion to use the
right.
Jackvony v. Poncelet, 584 A.2d 1112, 1117 (R.I. 1991) (emphasis added).19

18

See also id, at 8 ("If there is a taking, there must be an injury. Because the Council
found no injury, it necessarily found there was no taking of a substantial right.").
19

See also Mueller v. Bohannon, 589 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Neb. 1999) ("as to easements
created by express grant or deed, evidence of non-use could not by itself prove
abandonment no matter how long the nonuse"); Owens Hardware Co, v. Walters, 80
S.E.2d 285, 288 (Ga. 1954) ("The mere fact that one does not immediately begin to
exercise his right of use under an easement, or that he delays doing so for a number of
years, would not occasion a loss of the easement....").

Moreover, the trial court's constitutional analysis ("Because the Council found no
injury, it necessarily found there was no taking of a substantial right") is deeply flawed:
While its bare findings regardless do not support the conclusion of "no material injury,"
even if Park City could show that access 90 feet downhill was somehow just as good as
access near the front door - indeed, even if Park City could show that access 90 feet
downhill was better than access near the front door — it would make no difference under
the Takings Clause, for the taking itself is the injury.

See Daniels v. Area Plan

Commission, supra, 306 F.3d 445, 457 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court's decision to
enjoin planning commission from lifting restrictive covenant recorded on plat, even
though it was disputed that value of property owner's land was unaffected, and perhaps
even enhanced, by commission's action).
VL
The ABS Expansion did not Relocate an Easement
Both Park City and the Wilsons rely on the what is good for the goose theory of
real property law: ABS received permission to expand its lot and notice that Lot 23 might
seek to do the same. Hence, the Wilsons were entitled to move the ABS easement.
But one does not give up a property right simply by being notified that in the
future another may seek illegally to take it.

Moreover, the notice given to ABS's

predecessor said nothing about moving the easement.

Park City's Brief'at 8 - 9, Wilson's Brief at 16.

12

Appellees1 jurisprudence of whatfs fair is fair (or of what goes around comes
around) ignores another critical fact that is plainly recited in Park City's ordinance: there
was no easement across the ABS lot. Rec. at 705. Unlike the Wilsons1 effort, the ABS
expansion affected no other party's property rights. 2I Equity finds no purchase in the
case at bar.
VII.
Rather Than Permitting Easements to be Relocated, the CCR's Simply Codify
Utah's Common Law that the Dominant Estate Cannot Prevent the Fee from Using
the Easement for Non-Interfering Purposes
Under Article VI, § 8(c) of the CC&R's,
Declarant expressly reserves for the benefit of the Owner of each Lot in the
Subdivision an easement to ski across any portion of any other Lot which
portion is designated as "Ski Easement" on the Plat Map for the purpose of
gaining access between said Owner's Lot and ski runs at the Deer Valley
Resort. The existence of this easement shall not limit or restrict the right of
the Owner of any Lot in the Subdivision to construct buildings or structures
upon said Lot at the locations and in the manner permitted by this
Declaration.
Appellees argue that what the left hand gives in the way of easement location, the right
hand takes away by permitting easement relocation.

[f the drafters had really intended

to create a moveable easement, they easily could have said so.23 They did not.
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Moreover, the Wilsons received a much larger extension than the one obtained by
ABS, thus rendering these already irrelevant comparisons even more immaterial.
11

See also Rec. at 440 (March 13, 2002 Work Session; "Commissioner Erickson
commented that he believed they should rely heavily on the evidence from the CC&Rfs
that does not restrict building of the house if the ski easement is in one location or the
(Continued . . . )
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Under the CC&R's, "[t]he existence of this easement shall not limit or restrict" the
right to build according to the CC&R's.

"This" is an adjective of emphasis and

definition, here referring to what immediately came before: the easement located at the
place shown on the plat. According to Appellees, however, the last sentence of Section 8
revises the easement definition to simply mean an "easement," shorn of any geographical
location.
The Wilsons further claim that by stating the purpose of the easement - ski access
— the CC&R's show that the easement is mobile, because such access can be provided
anywhere.

Wilsons1 Brief at 29.

In stating the purpose (something every express

easement does) of the easement, the CC&Rfs are making it clear that the easements are
only for that purpose (ski access), not for the construction of barbeque pits, tree houses,
the laying of utilities, or summertime bonfires.
And rather than reading it first as identifying an easement location and then
stripping it away, the plausible interpretation24 of Article 8(c) is that the provision is an
example of careful real estate lawyers at work who wished to state the rule that has

other.").
23

For example, Article IV, § 14 of the CC&R's, "Slope Easements," permits the lot owner
to build "Improvements located within the Slope Easement." Similar language does not
appear in the provisions governing ski easements, yet the City Council read it in anyway.
See Rec. at 1091 ("[f|he CC&Rfs allow construction within the ski easement.") (Minutes
of May 23, 2002 City Council Meeting).
24

"[P]rovisions within a contract [must] be construed in harmony with each other." Lee
v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah App. 1999).
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accreted to Utah's common law over a century of practice: an easement is not a grant in
fee. The easement holder gets the easement only for the purpose described (ski access),
no other, and cannot use the easement as a means to deprive the fee owner of any use of
the land that does not interfere with the easement's use.
Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590 (Utah 1963), Wilsons' Brief at 24, perfectly
illustrates this point.
In Weggeland, the servient estate built a house whose wall came close to the
driveway easement line, with "the eaves overhanging the right of way a few inches." Id.
at 590. There was a door in the abutting wall, steps leading up to it, and also a gas meter
cover and assorted brooms placed nearby. The plaintiff argued that because his deed
gave him the ? exclusive" right to the driveway, the servient estate could do nothing on
the right of way whatsoever, including (apparently) building a house whose eaves
overhung the easement and otherwise cluttering up the abutting land. The Utah Supreme
Court disagreed: "The difficulty with the plaintiffs contention is that if it were sound, the
conveyance of the right of way would be tantamount to a conveyance in fee simple." Id.
at 591.
To the precise same effect is Stevens v. Bird-Jex Co., 18 P.2d 292 (Utah 1933),
Wilsons' Brief at 27 - 28, which - contrary to the Wilsons' suggestion - nowhere says
that an easement can be moved, but instead only held that the easement holder of a
driveway could not prevent the owner of the servient estate from using the driveway as
well, even when that owner operated a business, over 250 cars used the driveway a day,
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and the owner of the dominant estate alleged that he could not breathe from the fumes
thereby created. Id. at 295.25
Unlike the case at bar, Wade v. Dorius, 173 P. 564 (1918), Wilsons'Brief at 24,
did not involve an express easement. The whole point of the case was to figure out, in
the absence of a description in the deed, what kind of appurtenant easements had passed
during a transfer of title.26
Finally, if Article 8(c) had intended to permit easement relocation by the burdened
estate, it would have specifically referred to that estate. Article 8(c) instead says that the
easement "shall not limit... the Owner of any Lot in the Subdivision" to build according
to the Declaration (emphasis added). Thus, the easement holder may not complain that
an adjoining lot is too close to the easement, or that a house two lots over is blocking the
splendid easement view. But Article 8(c) nowhere grants any special privileges to the
burdened lot itself, which takes the easement as it comes.
ABS has never denied that the Wilsons could have built their home up to the
easement's edge,

could have arched the home over the easement, could have had steps

25

The Wilsons cite Stevens for the proposition that "an easement holder cannot interfere
with the servient owner's use of the servient land, as long as the easement holder's right of
passage is not impaired or requires additional expense." Wilsons9 Brief at 28. One cannot
leap from this rather unremarkable proposition to the result urged here: that express,
deed, and fixed easements can be moved.
26

"The deed, while conveying appurtenances as a matter of law, was nevertheless silent
as to just what the appurtenances were." Id. at 565.

27

Contrary to the Wilsons' claim, Wilsons' Brief at 28, ABS has never said that the
building pad could not be expanded. ABS instead asserts - Opening Brief at 19, the
(Continued . . . )
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abutting the easement, could have built a home with eaves that overhang the easement,
could have located utility covers on the easement, and could have put a picnic table over
the easement in the summer, when skiing is impossible and the purpose of the easement
cannot be fulfilled. But what the Wilsons cannot do is move the easement.
VIII.
The ABS Easement is not Wandering, but Fixed.
Cases on "roving," "floating," and similarly peripatetic easements have no place
here.
In Salt Lake City v. Walker, 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953), Wilsons9 Brief'at 28, one
easement was fixed, while another simply provided that Salt Lake City had a right of
way for ditches, power lines, and other facilities "to be constructed by the City wherever
these may be located now or hereafter . . . . " Id. at 368. This latter easement was thus a:
"floating" or "roaming" easement, the location of which may be fixed by
agreement of the parties, by the use of a particular way by the grantee with
the acquiescence of the grantor for a considerable period of time, or by one
party in whom the grant vests the right of selection or the right to fix the
grant, or where the rule of necessity determines the location because any
other place would annul, ruin, or militate against the grant.
Id. at 368.

citation used by the Wilsons - that the building pad could not be expanded over the
easement.
28

" Admittedly the right of way over the lands in Section 24 is 66 feet wide, and the center
line thereof is fixed by a starting point, directions and distances in the deed creating the
easement." Id. at 368.
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No such ambiguities attend the case at bar. Notwithstanding the Wilsons' claim made at least twice29 - that the plat shows only the "approximate" easement location, that
location is instead specifically set forth: the Lot 23 Easement (a) is 30 feet wide, (b)
provides ski access running from the common boundary of Lots 22 and 23, across Lot 23
in a northwesterly direction to the Last Chance Ski Trail, and (c) begins on the
southeasterly side of Lot 23 sixty (60) feet from Silver Lake Drive. Rec. at 1363, 1365,
1419, and 1421.
The plat fixes the location of the ski easement (and the Wilsons never explain why
moving the easement 90 feet downhill is in any way consistent even with the
"approximate location" theory - the Wilsons are really arguing that somehow the plat did
not suggest any location). The deed incorporates the plat. There is no need to fix what is
already set.

(Indeed, even in cases of roving easements, the roving stops once the

easement finds a home).
Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 97 P.3d 697, 2004 UT App. 256
(2004), Wilsons' Brief at 28, provides no respite for the Wilsons' cause, for that case
(wherein this Court reiterated that "[e]xpress easements involve real property interests,"
id. at f 9) again involved a roving easement, by definition the location of which was not
fixed in the deed. Id. at Tf 22. There is no need to resort to such issues when the ultimate
goal - where does the easement go? - has already been reached via express demarcations.
29

See Wilsons' Brief dX 21 (plat showed only a "rough approximation of where the ski
easement crossed"), at 25 ("the recorded plat map contains only an approximation of
where the easement crosses").
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IX.
Utah Has Not Adopted the Restatement Rule — nor Should It.
"Easements are . . . constitutionally cognizable property interests." First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002). The location of
the easement at bar is fixed. "The majority of courts that have addressed the issue have
held that they lack the equitable authority to order relocation of an easement, even if the
change is necessary to one estate and would not inconvenience the other." MacMeekin v.
Low Income Housing Institute, 45 P.3d 570, 575 (Wash. App. 2002). The Wilsons'
ultimate solution is to ask the Court to reverse - retroactively - long-settled rules of
property law. For a host of reasons, that relief should be denied.
1.

Utah Follows the Majority Rule Forbidding Unilateral Relocation of
Easements.

The Wilsons urge upon this Court the minority rule adopted by Section 4.8 of the
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes (2000), pursuant to which an easement may
be unilaterally relocated under certain circumstances, none of which exist here anyway.30
See generally Note: The Right of Owners of Servient Estates to Relocate Easements
Unilaterally, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1693 (May, 1996) ("Although the drafters of the
Restatement recognize the minority status of the latter rule, they have nonetheless chosen

30

Even under the Restatement, an easement may be unilaterally moved only when the
change is "reasonable," and does not "significantly lessen" the easement's utility,
"increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and enjoyment," or
"frustrate the purpose" of the easement." None of those factors were met here.
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to adopt it. This Note argues that the drafters1 selection of the minority rule is unwise/');
MacMeekin v. Low Income Housing Institute, 45 P.3d 570, 571 (Wash. App. 2002) ("We
decline to adopt the Restatement (Third) approach, and adhere to the traditional rule that
easements may not be relocated absent mutual consent of the owners of the dominant and
servient estates, regardless of how the easement was created.").
Regardless of whether New York has permitted unilateral relocation of easements
since 1865, Wilsons' Brief &\ 27, or whether the Restatement does so now, Utah follows
the majority rule. See Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Hyland Realty, Inc., 334 P.2d
755, 756 (Utah 1959) (owner of servient estate cannot ffchang[e] the course of the
easement or . . . construct^ facilities on or in the easement itself without the consent of
the owner of the dominant tenement.").
The Wilsons heatedly claim that the majority rule "lead[s] to the absurd result of
the ski easement 'tail1 wagging the ownership fdogf: it would elevate the ski easement over
the/ee interest of every lot owner to have a house on a lot." Wilsons' Brief'at 27. Such
pique is unconvincing, for the Wilsons have described (albeit in pejorative tones) exactly
what easements do - particularly explicit easements that show up on plats and deeds, thus
indisputably alerting the purchaser that the lot comes encumbered with a tail of definite
location. Easements cannot be obstructed by the fee owner. They cannot be "relocated"
absent the consent of the dominant estate. Had the Wilsons wished to avoid encumbered
land, they should have purchased elsewhere.

2.

Because it would Destroy Vested Rights, the Restatement Rule, Even if
Adopted, Cannot be Retroactively Applied to the ABS Easement.

Judicial decisions which would unsettle prior reliance should be only
prospectively applied.31 Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n of Utah, 862 P.2d 1348,
1352 (Utah 1993).32 When the ABS easement was created, Utah law unequivocally
prohibited the servient estate from relocating the easement without consent.

If the

Restatement rule is adopted and applied retroactively to the ABS easement, ABS will be
stripped of a property right (scores of other Utah easement holders will be similarly
surprised).
The Restatement rule itself is freighted with yet a further argument against
retroactivity, for it expressly permits the parties to draft out of the rule permitting
unilateral relocation by inserting a contract provision which "expressly denie[s]M that
right. Restatement, Section 4.8(3). See also Comment "ff ("[i]f the purchaser of an
easement wishes to retain control over any change in location, the instrument should be
3

Similarly, a statute (which a Restatement rule resembles) applies retroactively only if it
expressly so states. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-3.
32

The Utah Supreme Court has disavowed the federal rule requiring universal retroactive
application of judicial decisions:
We look to the impact retroactive application would have on those affected.
When we conclude that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state
of the law or that retroactive application of the new law may otherwise
create an undue burden, the court may order that a decision apply only
prospectively.

Kennecott Corp., 862 P.2d at 1352, quoting Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1025
(Utah 1991).
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drafted to accomplish that result."). No such contractual provision was required at the
time the ABS easement was granted. ABS never would have agreed with the developer
to a CC&R provision permitting the ABS easement to be moved 90 (or 60) feet
downhill.

The Restatement rule cannot be adopted unless the status quo ante is restored

and the parties given permission to bargain for the rights and limitations provided under
that rule.
Indeed, all lot owners must be brought in, because each easement is for the benefit
of all.34 The Restatement rule is in fact unworkable in cases of multiple holders of
multiple easements. Utah law, not the Restatement, governs the case at bar.
X.
The Wilsons are not Entitled to Equity.
The Wilsons are not innocent encroachers. Wilsons' Brief at 35.35 ABS moved for
an injunction in the companion case stopping construction pending the outcome of
litigation. The Wilsons responded that they wanted to start building. ABS argued that if
constructed, the portion of house over the easement would have to be torn down if ABS
prevailed. The TRO was denied. ABS unsuccessfully sought an interlocutory appeal.
See Ruling and Order at 1 (recounting history of the two cases).
33

Rec. at 439.

34

The CC&Rfs cannot be amended without an affirmative vote of 90% of the lots then
subject to thereto. Article VI, §5. The CC&Rfs cannot be amended under any
circumstances to deprive a Lot owner

35

"Appellees Wilson acted innocently, without knowledge or warning that they might be
encroaching on Appellant's property rights."

22

In Fairfax County Park Authority v. George Atkisson, 445 S.E.2d 101 (Va. 1994),
the recorded deed created an express easement. A subsequent purchaser of the servient
estate, despite the protests and demands of the easement holder, subdivided the estate,
built houses atop the easement, sold the houses to third parties, and a portion of
undeveloped land (over which also ran the easement) to the Fairfax County Park
Authority. 445 S.E. 2d at 103.
The dominant estate sued the developer, homeowners, and park authority. The
chancellor awarded damages, and further directed the park authority to provide a
different route for the easement. The park authority appealed. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed, rejected the developer's argument that "the chancellor's decree is
appropriate because it merely requires the relocation of the existing easement," 445
S.E.2d at 104, held that the existing easement could not be relocated without the consent
of all affected parties, and remanded the case to see if the disputants could agree on an
alternate site, and failing that, for an order directing the developer and the homeowners to
"remove any obstructions that interfere with the Atkissions* use of the express easement.
Id. at 105.
ABS repeatedly told the Wilsons that the easement could not be moved, and
sought all relief possible to stop construction. The Wilsons are not innocent encroachers.
XI.
ABS is Entitled to Fees and Costs. The Wilsons are Not.
Although they failed to advance this argument below (save for inserting the
standard request for fees in their response to the Petition for Review), the Wilsons now
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claim that they are entitled to fees for fending off the ABS attempt to "enforce" the
CC&R's. Wilsons' Brief at 37. ABS has not here sought (to use the actual phrase of
Section 1(a) of Article VI) to "enjoin the breach" of a CC&R covenant. ABS sought a
declaration that property law precluded movement of a deeded easement. See Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982) (fees
awardable only if permitted by statute or contract).
There has, however, been an illegal taking of ABSfs property right by state action,
for which Section 1983 provides a remedy. Daniels v. Area Plan Commission, supra,
306 F.3d 445, 451, 459 (7th Cir. 2002). Contrary to Park City's claim that this issue
arises for the first time on appeal, Park City's Brief at 21, n.7, ABS preserved below its
right to fees under federal law. Rec. at 1444 (memorandum), at 1634, p. 13, Ins. 19 - 25
(March 4, 2004 oral argument).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision, and that of the Park City Council, should be reversed,
the easement restored, and ABS awarded its fees and costs against Park City.
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